200301 Way Point Navigation

Way Point Navigation
Report No. 200301

Own ship was a fully-loaded VLCC, 22.00 metres draught, speed12kts in a NE'ly direction in the Dover Strait deep water channel approaching the S.W. Sandettie buoy on our starboard bow. At this point, the available deep water channel narrows to 7 cables, with the Sandettie Bank to starboard and the south-westerly lane to port, marked by F1 buoy. Own ship was displaying the proper daylight signal for a deep-draught vessel. The Master was conning with bridge team supporting. Hand steering in use. The other vessel was a large container ship, "White-Listed" registry and manning, proceeding north-easterly at 23 knots. No deep-draught daylight signal was observed. Moderate to good visibility, full daylight with a light wind and slight sea.

The other ship was overtaking own ship fine on the port quarter, about 2 miles astern. She had been watched from some distance astern. She had a visually open starboard-bow aspect, and the predicted CPA was constant at 0.5 mile on own ship's port side. Own ship had called her on VHF but no response had been forthcoming. At 1327 she called own ship and asked our intentions. Own ship responded that we were following the deep water channel and were restricted in our ability to manoeuvre by virtue of our draught of 22 metres. Course and speed information was confirmed. We requested the other ship to keep clear being the overtaking vessel under COLREGS. She replied, asking own ship to move over so that she could make her waypoint!!! We repeated that we were not in a situation to move over, and that the other ship should keep clear as she was the overtaking vessel under the Collision Regulations. Notwithstanding this, own ship moved about 2 cables to starboard of her course line to make a little extra room to port.

At 1333 she was still overtaking us and was by now just abaft of own ship's port beam. We had just started the small course alteration to starboard to round S.W.Sandettie buoy when she suddenly veered to starboard, towards own ship at a rapidly converging angle that could only end in collision if continued. We called the other ship on Ch16, warning her that she was dangerously close and should move off immediately. There was a reply that was not readily understandable but it would appear their bridge watch was somewhat under pressure. The other ship then veered off very sharply to port at such an angle that the final stern to stern clearance between the two ships was very minimal. She cut the F1 buoy (north of S.W.Sandettie buoy) very close, then headed at full speed across the south-westerly channel as if towards Thames ports or similar destination.

COMMENTS

1. Rule 13 was completely ignored.
2. This appeared to be "Waypoint Navigation" to the detriment of all else. If her bridge watch had been alert and spatially aware, and given that the south-westerly lane was clear, she could have gone to port, across that lane, several minutes before getting into such close proximity with own ship.
3. She was proceeding at excessive speed, in the sense that things were clearly happening too quickly for her bridge watchkeeper(s) to appreciate the rapidly developing situation. If she really felt it essential to make her WP, she should have reduced speed and dropped astern of us.
4. Even "waypoint navigation" cannot explain the final veer to starboard. Speculation is that a course alteration to port was probably intended from the start and that the initial veer to starboard was a "wrong-way helm" error. Her extremely close (and surely unintentional) encounter with F1 buoy would seem to support this possibility.
5. It appears that the bridge watch was stretched. It is not certain whether their Master was on the bridge. It is further uncertain which would be the greater indictment - that he was on the bridge and saw and approved of what was going on OR that he was not on the bridge when he clearly should have been at such a critical juncture.