WATCHOUT Complacency and distraction lead to grounding

Never is the navigating officer more crucial than in ensuring the safety of a ship and its crew at sea. Responsible primarily for human lives, they also safeguard valuable cargo, plus the ship itself and environmental safety. In this series, we take a look at maritime accident reports and the lessons that can be learned

The Scenario
A container vessel ran aground on a bank in the early hours of a winter’s morning. Her second officer had stood the lookout down and relied on the electronic chart system to navigate. He became distracted by his mobile phone and failed to carry out a planned course alteration, leading to the grounding. Although the Master was able to refloat the ship, the second officer’s lack of engagement in positioning caused easily avoidable damage and delay.

What happened?
The second officer was in charge of the bridge. He judged the weather conditions to be good and shipping traffic to be minimal with plenty of time before the course alteration needed to happen. Although all the information on the ship’s position was available to him, he did not make use of it.

Why did it happen?
The second officer was in charge of the bridge at the time of the grounding and had reported good conditions at sea, with few other vessels in the vicinity. About an hour before the ship ran aground, the lookout had been sent to stand-by in the crew mess as a result of the clement weather and lack of shipping traffic. He had taken this instruction to mean that he could go and get some sleep. 
Meanwhile, the second officer had become distracted by the VHF and was texting prolifically on his mobile phone. He checked the ship’s position only once when walking past the electronic chart display and did not cross-check it at all on either the paper charts or any other onboard positioning equipment. It is thought that the second officer’s text messaging activities distracted him further, so that the planned course alteration was missed, leading to the grounding about half an hour later. He only realised his error when he felt the ship’s vibrations a short while later.
The Master was alerted, and managed to refloat the ship after an hour by pumping out ballast and using the bow and stern thrusters, plus the main propulsion. A subsequent diver survey revealed two breaches of the hull into water ballast tanks, so the vessel was released to sail to her destination for temporary repairs.
It was concluded afterwards that the OOW had relied too much on the electronic charting system for positioning, and that the equipment had only been used in a basic capacity. No cross-tracking, no-depth, no-go or waypoint alarms were set on the system. Neither did the paper charts have regular positions marked, although they were the primary means of onboard navigation. Fixes were recorded in the log, but these were only derived from the GPS by the second officer, despite navigational best practice stating that positions always be cross-checked with independent sources.

What changes have been made?
A recommendation was made to the ship’s managers to review her ISM system to address navigational practice, electronic chart systems training and the use of mobile phones while at sea. Positioning procedures have been re-evaluated and officers reminded about the importance of remaining alert and avoiding becoming distracted while on duty on the bridge.