200323 Passage Planning Problem

Passage Planning Problem
Report No. 200323

After discharging at Singapore our orders were to anchor at west Jurong anchorage to clear outbound immigration and then proceed to East Bank OPL for further instructions. The Passage Plan was made for the vessel to anchor at the West Jurong anchorage and drop the pilot at western boarding ground 'B' then cut across the west bound TSS, go on a S.E.l'y course to join Philip Channel and finally to our OPL anchorage.

The Pilot boarded and we had just commenced unmooring, when the ships phone started to ring. It was from the Singapore office asking information about the maximum cargo intakes, ETA's etc. The Master informed them that the vessel was still at the berth and in the process of unmooring and manoeuvring and asked them to call later. A few minutes later, the phone rings again with more questions. In the meantime, the vessel was proceeding slowly through the Temesak Channel. The phone call was to tell the Master to request the pilot to divert the vessel to Eastern Petroleum Anchorage 'A' to anchor for immigration and possible bunkers (the company assumed that it was simply a matter between the Master and Pilot to arrange between themselves). The Master informed them that the pilotage has to be arranged by the agent through the Pilot Office or Port Authority. The vessel was now stopped in the Temasak Fairway, awaiting the authority for the extension of the Pilotage duty. Due to this sudden change in orders, there was no contingency Passage Plan ready.

The authority came through for the same Pilot to undertake this revised passage. The Master was kept busy with the phone calls and frequent internal calls to the engine room about bunker requirements and myself (OOW) drawing up the new Passage Plan. This meant that, as I was most of the time in the chart room and the old man was busy with the phone, we were hardly giving the needed attention to the ships movement and position fixing. Every now and then when I came out of the chart room I was unsure of where we were. Placing my faith in the Pilot and God, I resumed my Passage Planning. By the time I had completed this, we were in the middle of the Jong Fairway, having spent nearly 1 hour of undedicated bridge watchkeeping. It was only then that I could give my 100 percent to what was happening. The Master was still busy with other things. If there had been an accident, would the company have shared part of the blame with the master? The amount of emphasis within the company and outside authorities on Passage Planning (even with pilot on board) seems to have become secondary now to commercial pressures. How can the Master keep the vessel, its cargo and crew safe? I hope that this provokes some discussion on the subject.

Feedback 1

For many years now I have enjoyed reading the MARS reports. However, MARS 200323 was a frightening tale in which a watch officer thought it more important to direct his attention to drawing up a passage plan than to keeping proper bridge watch. First of all, I have some reservations about overly detailed passage plans. Sometimes, when I go aboard ships, I see the 2nd mate drawing up a plan that shows every buoy and navigation mark in a river, every intended course and speed change. On, for example, a trip from SW Pass to Baton Rouge, this will become quite an unwieldy plan. This type of preparation seems to be overkill; especially since the bridge watch officers that have to execute the plan will spend an inordinate amount of time checking off items during the actual passage and noting exceptions at the expense of proper watchkeeping.

For certain things it is good to have a plan; like for a vacation trip by car. You get all the necessary maps, locations of camping or hotel sites, information about road conditions, weather to be expected, etc. However, if you plan a trip to grandma's house, it would be pretty ludicrous to record in advance every turn, every lane change; every stop for a red light or stop sign; every time you speed up or hit the brakes, etc. Instead you have to pay attention to traffic on the road and the situation around you and react to it accordingly. The OOW in your MARS report admits that he was …."hardly giving the needed attention to the ship's movement and position fixing. Every now and then, when I came out of the chart room, I was unsure of where we were. Placing my faith in the pilot and God, I resumed my passage planning. By the time I had completed this, we were in the middle of Jong Fairway, having spent nearly one hour of undedicated bride watchkeeping."

Feedback 2

I did not read Mars 200323, but came across the response to it in the July 2003 issue, and I fully agree. I do not question the necessity of voyage planning but the way it has to be done.

Passage planning using a separate report is an excellent example of an interpretation of the ISM code imposing an additional administrative burden on the crew, instead of improving safety. Voyage planning has to be done at a time when the crew is usually already (over)stressed by cargo operations going on, so that safety may again suffer as a result of excessive time taken up by voyage planning. Or safety may suffer if only by not allowing the navigation officer to catch up on rest instead of doing paperwork

What is the use of looking at a chart, writing down the names of all buoys, landmarks and then adding routing instructions (courses, waypoints, distances off etc.), then later during the voyage reading the passage plan and look at the chart in order to visualise all the information. Sounds ridiculous? To me it does.

What better passage plan is there than a chart? You can write all the information you wish on it, at the exact place where it is relevant, and have it at hand in a very visual form during the voyage. It can be done much faster than when having to write down all the names of the buoys, lighthouses, depths etc. A passage plan has only been asked for just because you may have to convince PSC officers or ISM auditors that you have done it, and to prove that you have done it on the last voyage as well, and the one before, and so on. Would the charts of the actual voyage just undertaken not prove exactly the same, provided they are not cleaned up before the end of the voyage?

Another aspect is that for pilotage waters, the pilot may have a completely different approach to the passage as far as courses are concerned, fully based on his local knowledge. Most information of this nature is simply not available to the Master from the charts or from the Pilot books. Specialised local knowledge is exactly what you pay the pilotage fee for. I can see accidents happening due to distraction during the discussion between the master and the pilot when the latter wishes to do it another way than as described in the vessel's passage plan!

Moreover, the passage plan for pilotage waters can take an awful lot of time to prepare when rivers or other inland waterways are involved. I would therefore suggest that the burden of making a passage plan for pilotage waters is shifted from the vessel to the pilots. They can make a much more appropriate plan for the vessel, based on their local knowledge and experience with the type of vessel involved. It would not be a heavy burden to them, because they have it available and just have to fill in the tidal and traffic information etc. for the date concerned.

If they are provided beforehand with the vessel's handling characteristics for its actual loading condition, the pilots could send back a passage plan well before the ship's arrival at the pilot station. In this way, no time would be lost discussing all these matters after boarding and before proceeding. Any difference of opinion could be resolved beforehand. In these days of modern communications, that should not be a problem. The chart will then be the Master's ideal tool for following up the vessel's passage. For those areas of the World where the pilots do not yet use appropriate communications systems the charts will have to do the trick once again.

Please, let's keep it practical.

However, it is also necessary to make sure that PSC officers and ISM auditors are aware that charts and the information inserted on them DO constitute documentary evidence of the last voyage or of the voyage to be undertaken. The absence of, or an uncorrected chart constitutes evidence of a failure of the passage plan just as well! A file holder with the written voyage plans of past voyages is just a piece of unnecessary ballast, and excellent documentary evidence of a waste of resources!