98045 Keeping A Proper lookout

Keeping A Proper lookout
Report No. 98045

Many years ago the ritual of the daily noon sight was taking place on the bridge wing involving all the navigators. Fortunately, being rather bored with this fairly useless performance, I glanced forward and saw a ship right ahead about 1 mile away. A judicious leap into the wheelhouse and a rapid alteration to starboard allayed the fears of the ashen faced quartermaster and saved a potentially nasty situation.

The FOC tanker passed down our port side - there was no-one on the bridge, and our Captain, 1st Mate, 3rd Mate and 4th Mate were stunned and shocked as their horizon suddenly disappeared. No explanation was given as to why the 8-12 watchkeeper had not seen this vessel, perhaps he was too busy preparing for the daily performance. Nor was the quartermaster blameless, he had seen the other ship but said nothing. This could have been another mystery of the sea, the tanker was loaded and if a collision had occurred with both ships at full sea speed in the middle of the Pacific with less than minimal other traffic, there would have been a disaster.

One of the imperatives that I learnt on large sailing vessels was the requirement for a good lookout. Even with our comparatively small crew of about 30, there was always one person on formal lookout. Over the last few years I have become increasingly concerned over ships, even large container ships, with their One Man Bridge Operation. This is an unacceptable hazard which is waiting to become an incident. You can litter the bridge with as many radars, computers, DPGS, GMDSS, rasters, electronic charts and cellnet phones as you like but when something goes wrong with some of this gear then actual panic sets in.

I experienced this on a very "high tech" car carrier of some 60,000 tonnes outwards from Sheerness to Antwerp. As we were passing through the banks late one night all three radars went down, one after he other. Screaming, shouting and blind panic ensued and, to ease the situation, I pointed out the clarity of the visibility through the bridge windows and the ease with which they could navigate to the Wandelaar Pilot by looking out and plotting their position by visual bearings. Some of the steam subsided and they presumably got there safely - fortunately an ETA had already been sent so the ship was expected.

The same shipmaster, on a previous occasion, told me how the 2/O stationed at the ARPA, as they negotiated the separation scheme off Elsinore and into the Sound, totally misunderstood the information which she was being fed. There are many crossing ferries in this area and when asked about the approaching ferry on their starboard bow, announced that the vessel would pass 200 metres astern. As the radar she was using was right at the fore end of the ship overlooking the fo'c'sle head the Captain explained to her that 200 metres astern of where she was standing would have meant a collision on the starboard quarter.

This points out the dangers inherent in false information from ARPA at low ranges and fast moving vessels in these close quarter situations. Every radar screen should have the words "look out of the window" flashed up at irregular intervals and certainly the sentiment spelled out regularly to all watchkeepers in English and in their own language.