2011X46 Grounding of STENNA CHALLENGER

Grounding of STENNA CHALLENGER

Report No. OR05

The UK MAIB conducted an inquiry into the groundingof the cross channel ferry STENA CHALLENGER. This report has recently beenpublished and is available from HMSO, PO BOX 276, London SW8 5DT Tel (0)171873 9090. Fax (0)171 873 0011. The following extracts are taken from thisreport.
The vessel sailed from Dover at 2045, an hour later than scheduled. Theweather forecast indicated north-easterly gale force winds. The crew wereordered to put securing lashings on all large commercial vehicles and theassistance of a tug on berthing in Calais was requested via Calais PortRadio. After clearing the Dover Harbour limits, the Master handed over thewatch to the First Officer before going below for a meal and to do somepaper work. During the crossing, the Third Officer effectively kept thewatch with the First Officer overseeing him. This situation continued untilabout 2155 when the Master returned to the bridge to prepare for the pilotageinto Calais. At this time the vessel, was about 2 miles from the CA 6 buoy,in hand steering with one of the seamen on the wheel under the orders ofthe Officer of the Watch.

Under the supervision of the First Officer, the Third Officer handedover the watch to the Master, carrying out a set handover routine. The Masterthen confirmed that he had the "con" of the vessel. The wind,at this time, is reported to have been north-north easterly at 35 - 40 knots.

At about 2206 STENA CHALLENGER called Calais Port Radio on VHF Ch 12.Calais Port Radio was informed that the vessel was at the CA 6 buoy andwas asked to confirm that a tug was available. They replied that a tug wouldbe available on arrival, that STENA CHALLENGER should call Calais Port Radiowhen she reached CA 8 buoy and that the PRIDE OF BURGUNDY would be readyto sail within a few minutes. Receipt of this message was confirmed by STENACHALLENGER.

With the Master in charge and the First Officer monitoring the pilotage,STENA CHALLENGER began to make the approach to Calais, passing about a cableto the north of CA 5 buoy while steering 0750. EUROPEAN ENDEAVOUR was alsomaking an approach to Calais and was about one mile ahead of STENA CHALLENGER.At about 2207 PRIDE OF BURGUNDY called Calais Port Radio with the message"ready in five minutes". The STENA CHALLENGER's Master had alreadystarted to slow approach to await the departure of PRIDE OF BURGUNDY, thepropeller pitch had been reduced to about 20% ahead and the vessel sloweddown with the helmsman able to maintain the heading of 0750. At about 2210the PRIDE OF BURGUNDY informed Calais Port Radio that she was ready to depart.Calais Port Radio gave her permission to swing off the berth while the EUROPEANENDEAVOUR entered the port. This manoeuvre completed, PRIDE OF BURGUNDYreceived permission to depart and Calais Port Radio called STENA CHALLENGERto tell her that PRIDE OF BURGUNDY would have to leave before she couldenter.

The Master ordered the helmsman to steer 0650 in an attempt to bringthe head further into the wind as the vessel's speed slowed through thewater. The helmsman was able to do that but subsequently found it difficultto maintain the heading. At about 2216, the vessel was virtually stoppedin the water. The Master operated the bow thrusters to port and increasedthe pitch on the propellers. The wheel was handed over to another seamanat about 2218.

The Master became concerned that the vessel was not answering the helm.Over a period of three minutes, between 2216 and 2219, propeller pitch wasincreased from 20% to full ahead. The bow thrusters were acting full toport and the helm was hard to port. The Master ordered the helmsman to steer0600 but was told that the helm was already hard over.

PRIDE OF BURGUNDY cleared the harbour entrance outward bound at 2220.STENA CHALLENGER's Master maintained propeller pitch at full ahead and bowthrusters and helm to port, expecting the vessel to begin swinging intothe wind. This did not happen and at 2224 it was apparent that the vesselwas aground.

FINDINGS

The cause of the accident was the lack of adequate monitoring of the vessel's position with a consequent unawareness of the vessel's exact position at the start of and during the approach to Calais.
At the start of the approach to Calais Harbour the vessel was further to the south of the centre of the channel than thought.
When told that another ferry was leaving the port, instead of putting the vessel in a safe position to wait for clearance, the Master proceeded towards the harbour entrance at reduced speed.
While proceeding with minimum manoeuvring power, insufficient allowance was made for the leeway created by the very strong on-shore wind
When it was realised that the vessel was drifting to the south, full helm and power were applied too late to bring the vessel into the wind.
By the time that sufficient power had been gained the vessel was probably already aground.
There was a lack of pre-planning of the pilotage including no pre-programmed radar map or parallel index lines.
There was a lack of communication concerning the conduct of navigation in the approach top Calais.
The vessel was susceptible to the very strong on-shore wind, particularly from near the beam.
There was a lack of positive traffic control in the approach channel by Calais Port Control.
It is likely that the grounding would not have occurred if there was an additional light-buoy or beacon between CA 5 buoy and the harbour entrance to mark the southern boundary of the channel.