editorial (15)
Ship systems are protected by strict design standards and tolerances, by redundancy - particularly for critical systems - and by feedback processes that will ultimately activate an alarm of some sort, or take corrective action. Their efficiency and reliability will be undermined if they are not correctly set up, regularly monitored or properly maintained; these are tasks that, for the most part, have to be undertaken by the human element of any such system - that is, the seafarer.” (Alert! Issue 9)
It is the technological revolution that has changed the way in which people and systems interact with other people and/or systems. In the mari- time industry, the human element of the human-machine/system interface is becoming an endangered species, partly because of the drive towards smaller crew numbers, but largely due to increasing automation.
Automation should make life easier for the seafarer and make operations safer, but if an automatic system is not ‘fit for purpose’ or is not correctly set up, regularly monitored or properly maintained, it can lead to an accident - as a number of accident investigation reports have already testified.
Automation can also be to the detriment of situational awareness and that instinctive feel for something not being quite right. Furthermore, automation can change the role of an operator into that of a monitor.
It can also bring with it a plethora of alarms, which can be distracting, can cause confusion and can be ignored by those who are not aware of their sources and implications - thereby negating their important purpose of communicating to the operator that a hazardous situation exists or that a system is overloading or about to fail. Equally, if the seafarer has not been trained to recognise and respond to that alarm appropriately, then an accident may result.
There are some who suggest that all accidents at sea are as a result of human error because, when seeking the root cause of an incident, it is invariably the human input to the design, manufacture or operation of a system that has been a contribu- tory factor.
These causes can be as a result of faulty hardware or of software programming errors. But, they can also result from failures to follow a proper systems engineering approach to the design and build of a ship and its systems; from failing to meet the user needs and to follow the principles of human centred design; and failing to provide appropriate training and easy to understand operating and maintenance instruc- tions for the operator.
The shipowner must therefore provide the shipyard with a clear and prescriptive specification of what he requires in terms of automation and alarms. He should take account of both the operation and maintenance of each system and give user and usability requirements equal emphasis with technical requirements. He should ensure that automated systems are specifically designed to keep the operator engaged, alert and competent to make good decisions.
He should ensure that the seafarer is properly trained in the operation of each automated system and that he/she can recognise and respond to any alarm and take the appropriate corrective action in the event of a system failure.