200272 GMDSS and Unsafe Manning

GMDSS and Unsafe Manning
Report No. 200272

I read with interest the MARS 200217 captioned "why we need a lookout". In response to the subject of lookout, my observa-tions may be captioned as 'GMDSS & unsafe manning". Although STCW 95 puts great importance on the need of a continuous vigilant lookout by the 00W in Section A-Vlll/2 (safe navigation) parts 2, 3 and 3.1, the reality on board is quite alarming, especially at night. The steady reduction in manpower on board has brought about a situation where every officer has to do multiple jobs. The GMDSS watch requirement on the 00W who is on navigation duty is actually leading to unsafe manning. To avoid overtime expenses, few shipowners provide any assistance to the Duty Officer on the bridge at night.

Try to imagine the situation on the bridge at night with weather fresh to moderate. The Captain has kept company with the 00W until 2200 and then left the bridge with a request that he be woken up in case of any problems. The 00W is left by himself to maintain lookout duty as well as GMDSS duty. He keeps on the move, sometimes using the binoculars, needing to look through the Clearview screen during rain or snow, looking at the Radar to monitor the movements of other ships in the vicinity and taking actions to alter speed and course as necessary to avoid collision by consulting the ARPA. It is also required to check the position by GPS, compare it with DR positions on the chart and change course on the autopilot at predetermined positions. Now comes a GMDSS radio signal which the OOW must attend to. It may be a telephone call from Head Office or the Agents at the next port, it may be a radio telex message or even a DSC Alert. The GMDSS installation is located on the rear bulkhead of the bridge and the 00W is unable to maintain his navigation watch so long as he is attending the radio. If he is gossip-prone by nature, he would not lose the opportunity to spend a few minutes every time he answers and there is no guarantee how many calls he might attend to at night. If it is a radio telephone call for a crew member, the OOW is distracted from his look out duty for a much longer period. He also has to make entry in the Radio Log with timings, so he will use a small source of light and lose his night vision for a few minutes every time he uses a light. Does it comply with STCW 95 Section A-VIII/2 part 3.1 clause 14 or 26?

The IMO has given the clue for solving the problem in clause 16.8 for all seafarers to see. To the best of my knowledge only the Panama Maritime Authority has taken appropriate actions in their circular 118 which states that vessels must carry a minimum of two Watchstanding Deck Officers or one dedicated Radio Officer. For increased safety the IMO is stressing on duplication of all essential gadgets including the GMDSS installation, but why saddle the radio communication duty on the OOW who is already burdened with other duties. The false alert rate is still 97%, this was less than 2% with a dedicated Radio Officer on board.

It is on record that even in 2001 and 2002 merchant vessels have sunk without a single DSC Distress Alert sent either by terrestrial or satellite links (sometimes even the EPIRB was not used) despite full GMDSS installations in duplicate on board and all Deck Officers (including the Master) in possession of valid GMDSS GOC qualifications. In a panic situation only the dedicated Radio Officers can take all the steps necessary under the GMDSS scheme. Why discredit the Deck Officers by treating them as fully-fledged Radio Officers and requiring them to demonstrate their ability to operate all DSC equipment during Port State Control inspections?