202501 Collision causes 15 fatalities
As edited from MAIS (Hong Kong SAR) report
A loaded bulk carrier was underway at about 13 knots in a busy marine waterway, in poor visibility and in darkness. The bridge team consisted of the Master, the OOW, a helmsman and a pilot assisted by a co-pilot. Neither pilot had the con; both were advising the Master. At 21:09, the co-pilot advised the bridge team that a radar target was observed near 11° on the starboard bow at a range of 2.5nm and a speed of 10 knots. Visibility was about 2 nm and there was a slight drizzle.
The bulk carrier was steadied on a course of 260°. Both from the radar and visually, the target was fine on the starboard bow at a range of about 2nm. The target showed two masthead lights which were slightly open and a red sidelight. The co-pilot tried to attract the attention of the target vessel by flashing the Aldis lamp. By now, buoy CP-1 was fine on the starboard bow at a range of about 0.9 nm, while the target vessel was very fine on the starboard bow at a range of about 1.6 nm, showing a red sidelight. The pilot expected the target vessel to alter course to starboard, but it kept the same course and speed.
Some two minutes later the pilot asked the co-pilot to contact Vessel Traffic Services (VTS) on VHF radio. VTS was requested to provide information on the target and to advise the target vessel that the two vessels should pass port-to-port to avoid collision. VTS called the target vessel and instructed the vessel to take action to avoid collision. At this point, the pilot on the bulk carrier instructed the helmsman to alter course slowly to starboard in order to enter the deep water buoyed channel with CP1 buoy close on the starboard side.
By this time, the target vessel was very fine on the port bow and at a range of about 0.5 nm. Within seconds the target vessel was observed to alter course to port rapidly. The pilot ordered starboard 20 followed by hard to starboard. The co-pilot sounded five short blasts on the whistle.
As the target vessel continued to alter course to port, the co-pilot on the bulk carrier again sounded five short blasts on the whistle. The pilot ordered port 10 to allow the target vessel to pass clear ahead. Despite these actions, the bow of the bulk carrier struck the starboard quarter of the target vessel at about 90°. The collision was heavy and the bulk carrier vibrated violently. The engine was stopped and the crew mustered to go to anchor, as the forepeak was flooding.
On the target vessel, a supply tug much smaller than the bulk carrier, the engine stopped immediately at the time of collision and the vessel lost power and lights. The OOW informed VTS that the vessel was sinking. The vessel’s general alarm did not work, so the Master told the helmsman to raise the other crew members from below and abandon ship. The vessel quickly developed a heavy list to starboard and sank some four minutes after the collision. Seven crew members escaped the sinking vessel and were floating nearby. About 30 minutes later they were recovered from the water by search and rescue (SAR) units. Fifteen remaining crew members drowned inside the vessel.
Lessons learned
- With a closing speed of 23 knots, time is of the essence. The target vessel was detected on radar at only 2.5 nm. This leaves barely 6.5 minutes before collision. Keep a good lookout by all available means.
- The investigation found that ‘the pilot expected the target vessel to alter course to starboard’. Yet, for a near head-on meeting, both vessels should be expected to alter to starboard.