201049 Grounding during shifting of berth

Grounding during shifting of berth
MARS Report 201049

A partly laden tanker was shifting from the lightering berth to the main discharge berth, with a harbour pilot on board and with two tugs fast. A warship was fast to the berth immediately to seaward of the vessel's intended berth. As the vessel was approaching the main berth, abreast of the warship, the tanker stopped in the water although the main engine was still going ahead. Evidently, the vessel had grounded despite chart and pilot-provided data indicating sufficient water. 

After a number of astern movements, the vessel refloated and was safely berthed a few hours later, once the warship had cleared its berth. The grounding was at very slow speed and because the chart showed a 'soft' sea bed, the master assumed that no structural damage could have occurred. However several months later, during a routine ballast tank inspection, structural damage was observed in ballast tanks, attributable to this grounding incident.

Results of investigation
The passage plan for the port call was properly prepared berth to berth but specified a direct route to the berth;
Despite the fact that the direct safe route to the berth was obstructed, the pilot convinced the master that it was safe to take a diversion and pass to the side of the warship that was obstructing the direct passage;
The pilot was evidently anxious to avoid any incident with the warship and so in order to allow additional safety margin, deviated too far out of the berth approach channel;
The agents put commercial pressure on the pilot and master to berth the vessel without delay, despite knowing that the berth approach was obstructed by the warship.

Root cause/contributory factors
Lack of planning:
It was apparent from the call at the lightering berth that the depth data in the port was unreliable. This should have given the master sufficient cause to exercise extra caution in passage planning and vessel movement;
The vessel was close to the safe UKC limit even after lightering, and this was her first visit to this port. Under the circumstances, deviating from the direct approach to pass clear of the obstructing warship was risky;
The pressure and demands of a stressful sea passage preceding the berthing had placed a heavy burden on the master and the officers and may have affected their judgement.

Corrective and preventative actions
All fleet vessels instructed to ensure that:
The incident is discussed at the next safety meeting;
Proper passage planning is done using the best available information, including the latest berth and port information from the local agents;
Critical operations to be planned properly with additional contingency plans;
All key personnel are well rested, in compliance with STCW regulations;
Any alteration to the passage plan should be done only after close consultation and assessment by the bridge team;
Commercial considerations should never outweigh the requirements for safe navigation;
Due diligence must be exercised, particularly when calling at an unfamiliar port or when operating within tight parameters.