200447 AIS on the Internet
AIS on the Internet
MARS Report 200447
Further to my MARS report 200438 concerning the conflict of interest between information required by VTS schemes and the ISPS Code, it would appear from something I was shown the other day that my concerns are way behind the times and could now be irrelevant. My ship was undergoing an Annual Statutory survey by classification surveyor on behalf of the Flag State.
When the survey was completed, the surveyor and myself were discussing the ISPS code and its problems and failings. I brought up this subject of conflict of interest and was advised by the surveyor that my concerns were too late and the world had moved on. Then, with his laptop and mobile phone he called up a website called AISLIVE.com and we were able in real time to see all ships transitting the Dover Strait at 1910 BST on 20.07.04. We also had a look at all the ships berthed in the ports of Southampton and Rotterdam. This website is not worldwide yet but no doubt will be soon. As regards security, it is definitely not playing fair, if you take my meaning.
Admittedly the surveyor said that he had to answer a lot of questions before being given an access code to the website, but that should be no problem for potential terrorists or pirates. In addition, AIS does not give details of cargo but doubtless there is another website where this information can be obtained.
Therefore my concerns are really now irrelevant as, far from having to sit on the white cliffs of Dover with a marine VHF, any potential terrorist can sit in his own home, in any part of the world, and get the information he needs. Therefore the only answer to having real security for ships is to do away with the AIS equipment altogether, then tackle the conflict of interest with VTS schemes.
Readers' Feedback
1
Safety at Sea International's publisher, Lloyd's Register-Fairplay, is a partner in AISLive.com and Lloyd's Register-Fairplay's joint managing director Richard Silk noted the MARS reporter's concern about security risks. "But shipping movements have long been tracked and openly published", he said, and within other transport sectors, "making schedules widely available is common practice," he added, including live monitoring on the Internet of air traffic movements both in the air and at major airports.
He cited a study of the risks presented by the availability of geospatial information giving locations of targets such as oil refineries, power stations, ports, airports and train stations by the RAND Corporation National Defence Research Institute. "It found," said Silk, "that there was no tangible benefit in attempting to restrict information, since any potential attacker had a wide range of other means of acquiring the same or similar information for both selecting targets and planning an attack. … As such, AIS does not in itself represent any increase in risk." The reporter mentions Southampton and Silk noted that this port, like numerous others, already makes radar and movement information publicly available, independent of AISLive.
2
I gained access to AISonline within two minutes of logging on, no questions asked. It is a fascinating site and I could study it for hours on end. (I teach yachtsmen, so to me it could be a useful training tool). AIS must be very useful to bona fide shore authorities, ship owners, agents, the military, industrial spies and terrorists. (An LNG carrier alongside at Europoort is ripe for a RPG). The value of AIS to a practicing seafarer must be nil. I have read that it can be used in collision avoidance - if you believe that you'll believe anything.
3
Regarding the issue of the AIS shouting our details to all and sundry, as far as I am aware, it would still be legal to program the absolute minimum information into it (leave out destination, ETA, cargo and crew numbers etc) and operate on the 1W setting so at least you are limiting the range at which the rest of the info can be obtained. Any vessels close enough to be a collision threat would still be in range of your system and would still have enough info for their decision-making.
4
I found the comment on the use (/misuse?!) of AIS (MARS report 200447) for collision avoidance interesting. Here are some comments, purely personal views, on the same.
- The very reason for the IMO to include AIS carriage in SOLAS chapter V (Safety of Navigation) was collision avoidance. This amendment to SOLAS was put forth much before 9/11 and the ISPS Code. The security concerns only speeded up the implementation, removing the previous time-phased implementation dates and instead introducing the universal July 2004 deadline. AIS has been in use in the aviation industry for long, and as many other maritime concepts like VDR and VTS, we borrowed this from them, as a large section of the industry felt it would contribute to safer ships (or, at least, so it was suggested by the many conferences between 1985 and 2000).
- It appears that the ISPS code was merely an excuse for the IMO to speedily implement AIS. In my humble opinion, the link between AIS and Security is more contradictory and far fetched than that between AIS and safety of navigation
- By automatically transmitting info to VTIS, the AIS allows the navigator to concentrate on traffic rather than "waste" precious time in reporting (think of the time spent with the back to bridge windows while reporting to traffic in busy English channel or Singapore straits - yes, vhf sets on many ships are amazingly placed in this un-ergonomic way!).
- At the same time, most of us in the maritime industry are, justifiably, cautious of over-reliance on this aid to navigation. Perhaps being once bitten twice shy (we have seen over reliance on ARPA, the latest case being the collision of PONL Vespuci and the yacht Wahkuna in the English Channel in May 2003). Hence navigators need to be well informed of the limitations and errors of AIS.
- In this respect, having used AIS on my last vessel, I personally feel that the information regarding the destination and name of vessel provided by AIS is particularly useful and can contribute to aiding the OOW to make a better informed decision for anti collision. I realise that I thus join the debate on to use or misuse of VHF especially when approaching another vessel at TSS roundabouts and junctions like those in the Singapore Straits, English Channel, off the German Bight and The Casquets. However, one must remember not to put over-reliance on AIS data, since its accuracy depends on automatic inputs as well as to whether the bridge navigator has actually updated manual inputs. Also, matters such as possible target swap and propagation errors have not yet been fully studied.
I add some interesting sources of information -
http://www.waterman-ts.net/AIS/ais_hcb.pdf - Potential uses of AIS - by Hans Heinrich Callsen Bracker - Federal Ministry of Transport
Minutes of the 44th session - IMO Sub committee on safety of navigation
AIS Workshop - HQS Wellington, Jan 2003
IMO-IALA Seminar on AIS - July 2002
P.S. - Regarding the suggested secrecy of a vessel's route - all liner companies (which includes all major container and car-carrier companies) have their schedules on the internet. All carriers have facilities to track their cargo package continuously by entering the Bill of Lading number. This has been the case for ages and, being a commercial necessity, will not change. Hence, I sometimes find it rather silly that ISPS inspectors/surveyors ask us seafarers to keep our next ports of call confidential. The same information could easily be got by a terrorist from the loose tongue of a stevedore or shipping clerk!