200332 Collision with a Tug Wire

Collision with a Tug Wire
Report No. 200332

A vessel outbound from a port collided with a tug and barge in the entrance channel. The sailing had been delayed due to low visibility and fog but eventually the channel was opened to outbound traffic and a decision made to sail. Upon sailing, the visibility conditions continued to deteriorate and fog signals were started, however, by the time the vessel had cleared the harbour area, the visibility had reduced further. The bridge and engine room was fully manned with a Bosun and AB stationed on the bow for lookout and emergency anchor purposes.

The vessel was on full manoeuvring speed of about 12 knots. The Pilot stated that there was no traffic visible by radar and he required the speed to overcome a customary westerly set of the current in that area. On passing buoys 17 and 18 of the outer bank channel, a radar contact was observed in the channel near buoys 7 and 8 approximately 4.5 miles ahead. The Pilot attempted to contact the target on both channels 13 and 16 without success but maintained full ahead manoeuvring speed.
On passing buoys 11 and 12, the Pilot made the first successful radio contact with the unknown target and the vessel's speed was reduced to half-ahead. The Pilot explained to the Master that the target had been identified as an outbound tug with a barge in tow, and that he had agreed with the tug's master to overtake by turning to starboard.
On approaching buoy 9, the Pilot initiated the agreed starboard turn anticipating that the westerly set of the current would assist the vessel to swing to starboard. Shortly after the helm was put hard to starboard the bow lookout reported a red buoy just off the port bow (buoy 8). The Master and Pilot went immediately to the port bridge wing (in my experience, this is not a good move!! - Ed.) and, on seeing the buoy, the Master ordered hard to port in order to clear the buoy. The Pilot reminded the Master that the port turn would in effect head the vessel in the same direction that the tug was presumably turning. At this point there were further engine and helm orders to clear the tug and tow, however, the vessel crossed over the tow wire. The Pilot called the tug to release the tow wire, and when the vessel cleared the tow wire, the Master manoeuvred the vessel to anchor west of the channel in the vicinity of buoy 5.

There were no injuries on board the vessel or tugboat. After a diving survey of the vessel's hull, rudder and propeller, the attending Classification Surveyor found the vessel in all respects capable of continuing on her voyage, the only damage detected being a slight indent to one propeller blade.

Lessons Learned

Investigations showed that a comprehensive berth to berth passage plan had been prepared and executed. The Master/Pilot information exchange had been carried out in accordance with the Company Safety Management System and the Master had discussed the prevailing weather conditions and visibility with the Pilot. The abort plan was to anchor at "Anchorage X" if the visibility deteriorated and, although the visibility in the fairway was constantly monitored, it did not deteriorate drastically until the vessel was beyond the last possible abort point, at "Anchorage X".

The helmsman and Second Officer followed the instructions of the Master and Pilot, monitoring and logging the vessel's progress, however, the Second Officer was not involved with monitoring radar targets, this function being carried out by the Master and the two Pilots.

Investigations indicate that the root cause of the incident was:

1. Imprudent speed ordered by the Pilot and condoned by the Master during a period of restricted visibility. The Master relinquished command authority to the Pilot and did not insist on a safe speed even after an unknown target was observed on the radar, and
2. At a critical course change and closing distance with a radar target, both the Master and Pilot took apparent conflicting manoeuvring actions.

All Company Masters have been trained in "Bridge Team Management", and the company's "Bridge Team Management" manual is part of the Safety Management System. The aforementioned documentation clearly states that despite the duties and obligations of a pilot, it does not relieve the Master or Officers in charge of a watch from their obligations for the safe navigation of the vessel.

Rules concerning speed in restricted visibility are defined in the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972, and all Masters and Navigating Officers must adhere to these regulations.

The experienced and prudent Master will realise that no matter how well planned and conducted a passage may be, there may come a time when, due to change of circumstances, the planned passage may have to be changed or adapted as the voyage develops, according to changing circumstances.