200330 Communication with the Pilot vessel

Communication with the Pilot Vessel
Report No. 200330

Vessel "A" was proceeding out with a Pilot on board towards a Pilot Station. Some 30 minutes prior to arriving at the Pilot Vessel (PV), the ship contacted PV and informed them of her position astern of another outbound vessel and confirmed that, on arrival at Buoy "X", she would alter course to starboard in order to align with the outbound TSS. The onboard Pilot informed the Bridge Team that ship "B" was the first inbound vessel and that the Pilot Boat would put a Pilot on board ship "B" before coming alongside "A" to take off her Pilot. The Pilot Boat would come on the starboard side of "A" due to the fresh southerly wind and sea. Ship "A" should therefore pass about 0.5' to the North of the PV and that the safe speed for the disembarkation of the Pilot would be about 4 knots.

As ship "A" was approaching the Pilotage Cautionary Area (PCA), the PV was heard requesting ship "B" to alter her course to port. Within the next two minutes PV requested "B" to steer 065 and 040 respectively. At the same time "A" entered the PCA on a course of 270 and a speed of 9.2 knots. One and a half minutes later "A" confirms to PV that she would pass to the North and had already started altering course to starboard.

Shortly after this the engine was put to HALF AHEAD. Immediately afterwards, the PV called "B" and advised her of the intended track of "A" and requested "B" to steer more to port. Ship "B" had been acquired by "A" on the ARPA, "B" was also visually observed to alter her course to port and her masthead and starboard lights were visible. "B" was next observed to have slowed to about 7 knots and her bearing was opening to port.

Two minutes later, "A" was heading 285 and her engines were ordered to SLOW AHEAD - one minute later to DEAD SLOW AHEAD whilst her speed was about 7 knots. Just under two minutes later, the Pilot on "A" contacted PV and requested them to instruct "B" to alter her course to starboard. PV contacted "B" and informed her that the small pilot boat was under way towards her and requested that she adjust her course to steer 090. This instruction was confirmed by "B". At this point, "B" was observed to pick up speed and head towards the bow of "A". One minute later "A" called "B" and warned her not to cross her bow. This was confirmed by "B". Twenty five seconds later PV called "B" and urged her to immediately put her helm hard-a-starboard, this was again confirmed by "B". Thirty seconds later "A" calls "B" again and says that her own helm is hard-a-starboard.

These last calls from "A" went unanswered by "B" and there was no response from the sound signal of five short blasts. Thirty seconds later, when the distance between the two vessels was about 5 cables, "A" called "B" and asked her to put her engines ASTERN to avoid a collision. At the same time "A" increased her speed to gain more manoeuvrability. One minute later, with "A" heading 3000 at about 6 knots, the two ships collided.

There were two distinct instances when PV requested "B" to steer "more to port". At the first instance "B" replied "O.K., to port, port-to-port". At the second instance the reply was "Roger, port-to-port". In both these instances, the reply was unchallenged by the PV. It would appear that the PV was trying to minimise the distance which the small pilot boat would have to travel in rough seas. The PV's skipper maintained that he interpreted the response "port-to-port" to mean "A" and "B" passing port-to-port. However, it is contended that "B" could have equally meant to pass port-to-port with PV. Particularly as "A" was still outside the PCA in the first instance. If these ambiguous communications had been challenged, it may have averted the collision. The communications were further confused by the Pilot on "A" talking to PV in the local language.

It would appear that the OOW on "B", at least in the beginning, was somewhat hesitant in executing the course change directions from PV and there is reason to believe that the Master may not have been on the bridge in the initial stages of this incident.