2002X01 Lifeboat On Load Release Problems
Lifeboat On Load Release Problems
MARS Extra Report 01
Lifeboat On Load Release Equipment - Are There Real Solutions for Safety?
ALL seafarers have experience, both positive and negative regarding incidents with boat launching and recovery. Are the Manufacturers, Regulators and Owners really aware of the specifics of these experiences other than those causing death and serious injury? Design, maintenance and operational procedures are where the associated problems lie, but can we dig deeper into the problem?
Recently built ships are not exempt from potential danger, as the following example demonstrates.
VLCC's have specific operational idiosyncrasies for various reasons, one of which is finding an opportune time and location for a waterborne drill for the boats and crew. Having arrived early for a laycan in the Gulf a few years ago, we decided to use the extra hours at Fujairah to conduct a full drill of the boats. The vessel on which I was serving was three years old, well found and I was fortunate to have just been appointed Master.
Some trouble was experienced by the Officer in the first boat in releasing the hooks when water borne - all very stiff. The real "fun" started on recovery. The Morse cables to the hooks and hydrostatic interlock had frozen in the open position, therefore hopelessly jamming the system. No encouragement would convince the hooks to reset. Dark was rapidly approaching, as was the latest departure time to make the start of a laycan in the Gulf. At the time, it really wasn't as easy to solve as it is to now write about!
As a temporary solution, we disconnected the cables to the hooks and the hydrostatic interlock, manually ensuring that the boats were safe to retrieve. The whole process took many hours of stressful activity by many people. One consolation was that it motivated me to find a permanent solution, as well as to discover the root cause of this dangerous situation. Firstly we hunted down the drawings, at which time I realised how disorganised Lifeboat information was presented. In all, there were six manuals for the one item of safety called a "Lifeboat", namely,
- Lifeboat manual
- Lifeboat engine operations manual
- Lifeboat engine maintenance manual
- Lifeboat Davit manual
- Lifeboat Davit winch and electrics manual.
- Lifeboat Onload Release system manual.
Understandably, all were written by different manufacturers and were NOT grouped together in the same section of the yard supplied Index of Drawings. Fortunately the Lifeboat Onload Release equipment manual was clear, complete and satisfied the requirements of SOLAS for onboard instructions of maintenance. Planned maintenance schedules of weekly, monthly, annual and five yearly work were precise and easy to follow.
Basically our system required a lot of work, including replacement of cables and an investigation into the frozen hydrostatic interlock. What we found was horrifying, even though the boats had religiously been waterborne at three monthly intervals. Installed in the bilge, using a mixture of stainless steel bolts and an aluminium casing, the hydrostatic interlock was destined to fail, hence creating a highly dangerous situation for the unsuspecting crew. It was one of the worst cases of galvanic action and poor seamanship which I had encountered. Electrolysis had overcome the original design tolerances and rendered the equipment unusable.
The next problem was also design related. Clearly stated in the manual was the instruction to operate the system at monthly intervals and to grease the mechanisms at the hooks. Importantly, "DO NOT PAINT" was specified for the hook arrangement, to avoid the possibility of lack of movement at a critical time. Naturally, stainless steel was NOT used in the hook constructed, hence seaman DO tend to PAINT steel to stop rust!
"To test the release mechanism", stated the manual, "fit the supplied maintenance pendants between the davit head and the lifting lugs on the boats". As with all ships I have seen, this particular vessel had no such arrangement at the davit heads - they were constructed and supplied by a different manufacturer. Suffice to say we fitted lifting lugs to the davit heads, requested suitable pendants with certificates, and started the monthly testing, with new morse cables and a fully overhauled hydrostatic interlock. It must be noted here that a three monthly in water drill is the ONLY time that most on load mechanisms are operated on the world's merchant fleet - am I correct?
To make a simple analogy, it is paramount to a pump cover needing to be opened at three monthly intervals, where the internal components are to be inspected monthly - quite ridiculous!
The main aim of this discussion is to raise awareness for other vessels which will most certainly be sailing with a similar "time bomb". This potentially fatal recipe was caused by:
- Mismatching of components in the single safety system called the "Lifeboat".
- Incomplete systems due to confused boundaries of responsibilities - i.e. the need for a maintenance link between boat to davit - not completed.
- Incompatible and unsuitable metals used in vital components of the safety system, in a highly corrosive environment.
- A regulatory system allowing the fitting of such systems, which cannot satisfy SOLAS, yet have to be confronted and rectified by seafarers. Where do Classification Societies enter into this responsibility?
Most concerning is that this case was not from a minor substandard yard, but from one of the largest builders in the world.
I strongly suggest that everybody looks at their own lifeboat systems, with the appropriate manuals, to ensure that we are all proactive in reducing lifeboat casualties and protecting the safety of seafarers.