200012 A Bridge Automation Too Far

A Bridge Automation Too Far
Report No. 200012

I am in danger of entering into a passionate discourse about bridge automation and its evils but that would create the wrong impression and would probably brand me an old fashioned stick in the mud. Instead I shall comment about one particular item of automation which frightens the life out of me! In a recent MARS report one of two ships proceeding up channel mysteriously altered course towards the other whom she was overtaking and then, even more mysteriously, appeared to correct the error and sheared off to port, thus averting a collision. The officer in the overtaken vessel was probably somewhat shaken by the encounter.

The incident was similar to one I witnessed. I was on the bridge wing talking to the Second Officer when the ship mysteriously altered course. I immediately noticed the change but was rather disturbed at the officer's nonchalance in informing me, in response to my questioning, that the ship had reached a Waypoint and the GPS had altered course!!! The ship had recently been taken over from another company. We immediately ordered the disconnection of the GPS from the Autopilot. An incident on the eastern seaboard of the USA involving such equipment on a cruise ship was still fresh in our memories.

Returning to the original incident described, I wonder if the overtaking ship was similarly equipped and did a similar event occur? It is evident to me that shipyards are increasingly producing ships with "Fully Integrated" bridges as a standard item. If one reads the naval architecture, ship construction and even ship management magazines, such equipment is seen as something to be proud of. How many mariners have been consulted?

Is it too late to shout loud in protest at this premature introduction of a lethal weapon? Aircraft may have such systems but they also have the added dimension of altitude to help prevent collisions as well as a very strictly regulated oversight by not one, but two pilots. Driverless trains are a reality on the Docklands Light Railway and between airport terminals but again the regulatory environment is very strict indeed. We have no such safeguards on the sea. The separation aids which are in place are imaginary lines marked on charts, occasionally assisted by navigation aids. They are entirely dependent on humans ensuring their ships are correctly positioned. Unfortunately there are too many people both at the design stage and operating at sea who do not give enough thought to the possible disastrous results of their actions. One only has to read MARS to appreciate that.

When the next yachtsman or fisherman is run down; when the next catastrophic collision occurs between two leviathans, will the designers take any share of the responsibility? Human error extends much further than just the operator.